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Abstract: 
In the ever-evolving domain of international law, there are milestone cases and rulings that bring 
forth new international norms and mark the beginnings of jurisprudence on certain matters. This 
paper looks at the milestone case of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 
wherein the damming of the Danube and The Treaty of 16 September 1977 concerning the 
construction and operation of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks and both countries’ 
actions regarding the project were contested. The case brings to light, for the first time in the 
International Court of Justice, the necessity to preserve the environment, the right to the 
environment as a human right, and the transboundary water law. Although the rulings did not 
take into consideration enough of the above factors, the published opinions of judges, specifically 
Judge Weeramantry’s interpretation of the case of sustainable development in the context of 
human rights has been the primary step to discussions at an international level and jurisprudence 
on the matter. This paper gives an in-depth look at the specificities of the case and ruling, 
followed by the analysis of its importance in modern international law. 
 
Résumé : 
Le domaine de droit international en est un qui change sans cesse. Ces changements viennent 
avec certain cas et décisions qui marquent la percée de certains sujets sur la scène internationale. 
Cette dissertation examine le cas du Projet Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie/Slovaquie), et 
analyse son effet sur la jurisprudence des droits humains à l’environnement. C’était la première 
fois que la Cour International de Justice devait se prononcer sur une affaire impliquant le droit 
international de l'environnement et du droit des eaux transfrontalières, et la Cour elle-même n’a 
pas pris en considération les facteurs ou lois environnementaux. Toutefois, les opinions de 
certains juges, spécifiquement celui de Juge Weeramantry, ont établi les droits à l’environnement 
comme un droit humain sur un niveau de droit international.  
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The dispute surrounding the Danube dam arose from the signing by two states: the Hungarian 
People's Republic and the Czechoslovak People's Republic (hereinafter referred to as Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia), of The Treaty of 16 September 1977 concerning the construction and 
operation of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks (hereinafter referred to as the “1977 
Treaty”)1. The purpose of the 1977 Treaty, as outlined in Article 1 (1), was to “…construct the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks (hereinafter referred to as the “System of Locks”) as a 
joint investment; the System of Locks shall comprise the Gabčíkovo system of locks and the 
Nagymaros system of locks and shall constitute a single and indivisible operational system of 
works.”2 The purpose of this system was the joint and equal utilisation of the Danube River by 
the contracting parties. It was a joint investment aimed at improving navigation along the 
Danube, producing hydroelectricity, protecting the banks along the river that flood virtually 
yearly3, further developing irrigation systems in the area, and protecting the environment4. It is 
also evident that economic interests played a prime role in the drawing up of the 1977 Treaty.  
 The stretch of the Danube this project concerns is that of approximately 200km between 
Bratislava, Slovakia and Budapest, Hungary5. The 1977 Treaty outlines with specificity that: this 
is to be an equal investment by both States (Article1, Article 2, Article 5); the water resource 
management functions (Chapter 5), the protection of water quality (Article 15) and the protection 
of the natural environment (Chapter 7). Ultimately, the Danube was to be diverted to a new 
waterbed in Slovakia where it would be utilized for the aforementioned goals. This would be 
                                                 
1 In 1993, the Slovak Republic became the Successor State to the Treaty after the division of Czechoslovakia. 
2 Treaty Between The Hungarian People’s Republic and The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Concerning the 
Construction and Operation of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks, Article 1 (1) 
3 Compendium of Judicial Decisions on Matters Related to Environment. Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP/UNDP/Dutch Joint 
Project on Environmental Law and Institutions in Africa, 1998.  
4 Lee G.J. Thompson. "The ICJ and the Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project: The Implications for 
International Watercourses Law and International Environmental Law." CEPMLP Annual Review 1999.  
5 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia), 
Summary of the Judgment of 25 September 1997 
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done through the construction of two sets of locks: one in Nagymaros, Hungary, and the other in 
Gabčíkovo, Slovakia, and would form an ‘indivisible operational system’ as described in Article 
1 of the 1977 Treaty. The work commenced in 19786. 
 It should be noted that Hungary signed the 1977 Treaty while under communist reign, as 
did Czechoslovakia. In 1989 with the changes in regimes, new environmental assessments were 
conducted as to the effects of the construction and of the overall project7. Between the two 
countries, the results varied greatly. The Hungarian population began to heavily protest on the 
grounds of the harsh economic and environmental implications being suffered by the country and 
put immense pressure on the government to discontinue with the project. The Hungarian 
government abandoned work in Nagymaros in October of 1989 as a result of detrimental 
projections of environmental impacts from the assessments and the political pressures, and later 
that year ceased all construction on the parts of the System of Locks it was responsible for 
according to the 1977 Treaty8. This gave way to many negotiations between the two countries to 
attempt to resolve the conflicts, none of which led to agreements. Frustrated, Czechoslovakia 
resorted to ‘variant C’: its own solution consisting of a unilateral diversion of the waters in order 
to put the Gabčíkovo damn into operation9. By 1992, it completed closure and damming of the 
Danube. The damming of the river reduced the flow of water to Hungary by approximately 80% 
(2m-4m) as it was done in a season where the water is at its lowest level10. In reply, Hungary 
                                                 
6 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,   
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997,  
7Kevin Kurland, Jerry Fortunato, Leslie Barcus. "Hungary Dam, Case 34." in Trade and Environment Database, case 
34 (1998)  
8 Lee G.J. Thompson. "The ICJ and the Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project: The Implications for 
International Watercourses Law and International Environmental Law." CEPMLP Annual Review 1999 
9 Lee G.J. Thompson. "The ICJ and the Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project: The Implications for 
International Watercourses Law and International Environmental Law." CEPMLP Annual Review 1999 
10 Eckstein, Gabriel E., Yoran Eckstein. “International Water Law, Groundwater Resources And The Danube Dam 
Case”. Washington College of Law, American University. International Water Law Project 
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announced the termination of the 1977 Treaty11. In 1993 the signatories agreed to submit the on-
going dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
 
Main Legal Issues, Position of Parties 
The ICJ was asked to rule on several issues brought forth: 
• "whether the Republic of Hungary was entitled to suspend and subsequently abandon, 
in 1989, the works on the Nagymaros Project and on the part of the Gabcikovo Project 
for which the Treaty attributed responsibility to the Republic of Hungary"12 
• "whether the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was entitled to proceed, in 
November 1991, to the 'provisional solution' and to put into operation from October 
1992 this system"13 
• "what are the legal effects of the notification, on 19 May 1992, of the termination of 
the Treaty by the Republic of Hungary"14 
For the first time in the history of the ICJ, there was a sight visit done to assess current 
circumstances of the projects in the affected areas of a case. This was asked by Slovakia, and 
Hungary provided full cooperation and invited the ICJ to do so15. 
 
Suspension and abandonment by Hungary, in 1989, of works on the Project  
In 1990, the new government of Hungary announced that “the project was a mistake”16 and that it 
could not be "obliged to fulfil a practically impossible task, namely to construct a barrage system 
                                                 
11 Heiko Fürst. "The Hungarian-Slovakian Conflict over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dams: An Analysis." 
Intermarium 6, no.2 (2003) 
12 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia), Summary of the Judgment of 25 September 1997 
13 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia), Summary of the Judgment of 25 September 1997 
14 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia), Summary of the Judgment of 25 September 1997 
15 1997 International Court of Justice Report of Advisory Opinions and Orders 3 1997, Case Concerning The 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Osgoode Hall Law School Library, HeinOnline 
5 
 
 
on its own territory that would cause irreparable environmental damage"17. The representatives 
argued that the communist regime at the time had neither the wellbeing of the citizens or land in 
mind, nor the interests of the country and the protection of its environment, and the Treaty was 
signed for tainted reasons. This was a claim of fundamental change in circumstances.  
 Hungary claimed a state of ecological necessity18 to justify the cessation of construction19. 
After requesting expert opinions and assessments, the Hungarian government saw many 
ecological dangers as a result of the project: the water quality would be drastically diminished 
due to silting and erosion, the biodiversity was put at risk of extinction, and there was risk of 
eutrophication20. To apply this, Hungary drew on the applicability of the Vienna Convention on 
The Law of Treaties and the law of State responsibility21. This would imply that the State of 
Hungary had no other means of safeguarding its national interests, in this case the environment, 
than to abandon its international obligation. 
Slovakia rebutted that all ecological problems resulting from the construction of the 
System of Locks could and would be remedied22, thus insinuating that Hungary had other means 
to protect their interests, negating the claim of ‘state of ecological necessity’. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
16 International Court of Justice: Judgement in Case Concerning The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Osgoode Hall 
Law School Library, HeinOnline, 37 I.L.M. 162 1998 
17 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,   
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p.56 
18 “The state of necessity is “the situation of a State whose sole means of safeguarding an essential interest threatened 
by a grave and imminent peril is to adopt conduct not in conformity with what is required of it by an international 
obligation to another state.” -“International Decisions”. Nairobi, Kenya, Compendium of Judicial Decisions on 
Matters Related to Environment: UNEP/UNDP/Dutch Joint Project on Environmental Law and Institutions in Africa, 
1998 p.14 
19 Jessica Howley. “The Gabci kovo-Nagymaros Case: The Influence of the International Court of Justice on the Law 
of Sustainable Development” Queensland Law Student Review, Vol 2:1, (2009) 
20 UNEP/UNDP/Dutch Joint Project on Environmental Law, “International Decisions” Compendium of Judicial 
Decisions on Matters Related to Environment 1, December 1998. 
21 International Court of Justice: Judgement in Case Concerning The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Osgoode Hall 
Law School Library, HeinOnline, 37 I.L.M. 162 1998 
22 UNEP/UNDP/Dutch Joint Project on Environmental Law, “International Decisions” Compendium of Judicial 
Decisions on Matters Related to Environment 1, December 1998. 
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Czechoslovakia’s implementation of the ‘provisional solution’ or ‘variant C’ 
 Hungary stated variant C to be a breach of the 1977 Treaty, as well as a treaty ratified by 
the two parties in 1976 regarding the water management of boundary waters, and a breach of the 
“…principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, with the inviolability of State borders, as well as 
with the general customary norms on international rivers and the spirit of the 1948 Belgrade 
Danube Convention"23. It claimed that it was an international wrongful act to deprive a state of 
their rightful share of natural resources by unilaterally taking control of a shared resource.  
 It must be taken into account that in 1992, Czechoslovakia agreed to stop the 
implementation of the provisional solution and to continue working on the System of Locks: a 
motion which was rejected by Hungary. At this time, Czechoslovakia made the case that 
resorting to variant C was inevitable as Hungary was not willing to resume the fulfilment of its 
responsibilities set forth in the 1977 Treaty. Because Hungary abandoned the project at such a 
late state, Slovakia (successor of the 1977 Treaty) claimed the duty to mitigate the ecological, 
economical and navigational damages imposed upon it24. It claimed that a “…State which is 
confronted with a wrongful act of another State is under an obligation to minimize its losses and, 
thereby, the damages claimable against the wrongdoing State”25. Later in court, Slovakia refuted 
the accusations of an international wrongful act on account of Hungary’s actions disabling its 
abilities to fulfil the duties with which it was attributed by the 1977 Treaty, and thus entitled it to 
enact a solution as close to the original project as possible26, this being the ‘principle of 
approximate application’27. Slovakia insists that variant C is justifiable as a countermeasure. 
 
                                                 
23 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,  Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997 
24 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,  Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997 
25 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,  Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997 
26 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,  Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997 
27 UNEP/UNDP/Dutch Joint Project on Environmental Law, “International Decisions” Compendium of Judicial 
Decisions on Matters Related to Environment 1, December 1998. 
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Termination of the Treaty by the Republic of Hungary 
 The State of Hungary claimed variant C as a breach of not only the 1977 Treaty, but also 
a major violation of international law (for the aforementioned reasons). It gave warning that if 
immediate cessation of construction on variant C did not occur, it would be forced to respond to 
this state of necessity by termination of the 1977 Treaty. Hungary reasoned so by stating that: it 
could not support the destruction of the environment, nor the implementation of variant C as it 
was as destructive ecologically as the original project, that this provisional solution, by diverting 
the course of the Danube, infringed on the sovereignty of the Hungarian State as well as violating 
several international agreements28. Hungary claimed the impossibility of performance of the 1977 
Treaty, the occurrence of the regime change which qualified as a change in fundamental 
circumstances, and the formerly mentioned material breaches of Czechoslovakia, namely that of 
The Convention of 31 May 1976 on the Regulation of Water Management Issues of Boundary 
Waters. The final argument provided by Hungary was that there are new norms of international 
environmental law, which supersede the 1977 Treaty29. These are the grounds upon which 
Hungary chose to end the 1977 Treaty. 
 Czechoslovakia responded to the threat of termination by agreeing to participate in good 
faith in any and all negotiations; however it refused to halt work on the provisional solution. It 
denied that Hungary was in a state of necessity based on scientific fact, thus had no grounds for 
termination. Slovakia contended that the changes in fundamental circumstances did not, in any 
way, effect changes in the responsibilities agreed to in the 1977 Treaty and were irrelevant. 
Slovakia denies breaches on its behalf, as well as on behalf of Czechoslovakia, claiming that 
water quality and nature were monitored and protected at all times, and due to the fact that 
                                                 
28 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,  Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997 
29 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,  Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997 
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variant C was used as "the best possible approximate application"30 of the 1977 Treaty. Slovakia 
denied and refuted any and all reasons given by Hungary to terminate the 1977 Treaty. 
 
Ruling of The International Court of Justice 
Suspension and abandonment by Hungary, in 1989, of works on the Project  
The Court did not accept Hungary’s actions to abandon work at the designated locations by the 
1977 Treaty as lawful. It views these actions as an unwillingness to comply with the binding 
responsibilities attributed to it in the 1977 Treaty and as actions that undermine and render 
impossible the fulfilment of the "single and indivisible" project agreed on31. 
The Court ruled that Hungary did not meet the requirements needed to claim a state of necessity. 
It points out that at the time of claiming state necessity these circumstances were not present; 
these actions were ruled unlawful, and thus Hungary incurred State Responsibility32.  
 
Czechoslovakia’s implementation of the ‘provisional solution’ or ‘variant C’ 
The Court has determined that Hungary was unlawful in abandoning its responsibilities. These 
actions made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to fulfil its duties according to the 1977 Treaty; it 
follows that Czechoslovakia was allowed to proceed with its solution, applying the ‘principle of 
approximate application’. It is noted that Czechoslovakia was the victim of an international 
wrongful act. Although this warrants its claims to mitigate damages, it does not justify the 
damming of the Danube, which The Court deems as an international wrongful act on the grounds 
                                                 
30 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,  Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997 
31 1997 International Court of Justice Report of Advisory Opinions and Orders 3 1997, Case Concerning The 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Osgoode Hall Law School Library, HeinOnline, 1997 
32 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,  Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997 
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of unilateral control of a shared resource. Otherwise put, Czechoslovakia was entitled to mitigate 
damages, but in 1992 was unlawful in proceeding with variant C. 
 
Termination of the Treaty by the Republic of Hungary 
With regards to the five arguments presented by Hungary as grounds for termination of the 1977 
Treaty, The Court ruled the following: even if a state necessity was to exist, it is not grounds for 
termination of a treaty in this case; there was no impossibility of performance as the treaty 
provided the necessary tools for renegotiation and readjustment to address Hungary’s concerns; 
the political circumstances were not closely linked to the signing of the Treaty and are therefore 
not considered a fundamental change in circumstances; the material breach of Czechoslovakia 
occurred after Hungary had claimed termination of the 1977 Treaty; and as the breach did not 
occur until the damming of the Danube in 1992, and the notice of termination was sent earlier in 
the year, the notice was premature and the development of new norms in international 
environmental law are relevant to the case. However, the provisions of the treaty allow for the 
implementation of practices adhering to these new norms, and that these developments are not 
ground for termination. The Court found that with the above conclusions, it follows that 
Hungary’s notice of termination did not have legal effect and the 1977 Treaty is still valid.33  
 The Court stated that unless the parties can further negotiate, Hungary is to pay 
reparations for the damages incurred to Czechoslovakia and Slovakia due to its abandonment of 
the System of Locks34.  
                                                 
33 Judgements paraphrased from: Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,   
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997 
34 Summary of the Summary of the Judgment of 25 September 1997, Case concerning Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary/Slovakia), I.C.J Reports 
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 The decisions were not unanimous and it is worthwhile to mention the positions of the 
opposed judges, Judge Weeramantry in particular, who drew on the principle of sustainable 
development. It was stated that this is an integral part of modern international law and should 
have been taken into account more so than it had been, encompassing environmental impact 
assessment, environmental protection and factors such as environmental damage. Judge 
Weeramantry noted that there were other factors and actions of the parties to consider, however; 
had that not been the case, Hungary’s contentions would have been conclusive35. He stated that 
there is a great ‘need for human activity to respect the environment’, and that this should be 
regarded as a universal international value and as a human right36. 
 
Implications of The Ruling  
The Court’s ruling meant that the 1977 Treaty was still in effect and still governed the 
relationship between the two parties regarding the System of Locks. They suggested further 
negotiations as a means to achieve the goals and objections set forth by the original project. One 
option it suggested was that of modifying variant C to conform to the 1977 Treaty in a manner 
that Hungary could utilize as well, while taking into consideration the grave environmental 
concerns brought forth by Hungary. In addition, the ICJ stated that Czechoslovakia’s breach of 
the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses could end 
as collaboration and would be a shared utilization of the source, and no longer a unilateral one37. 
 
 
                                                 
35 UNEP/UNDP/Dutch Joint Project on Environmental Law, “International Decisions” Compendium of Judicial 
Decisions on Matters Related to Environment 1, December 1998 
36 Jessica Howley. “The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case: The Influence of the International Court of Justice on the Law 
of Sustainable Development” Queensland Law Student Review, Vol 2:1, (2009) 
37 Judgements paraphrased from: Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  (Hungary/Slovakia) ,   
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997 
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Analysis 
The ICJ had never ruled on a transboundary water issues before the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. 
This was an opportunity for the ICJ to set a strong precedent, and rule on issues concerning 
transboundary environmental harm. It also offered an opportunity to rule on the ownership, 
protection and sharing of natural resources, and apply international water law38. The ICJ stated 
that it deemed necessary to demonstrate “the great significance that it attaches to the 
environment, not only for states, but for the whole of mankind39.” Although this was stated, the 
Court declined to consider the validity or value of the data provided, as it was not in the Court’s 
scope to determine scientific value or validity. The Court relied on the more traditional methods 
of using international treaty law to rule on the case, thus it can be argued that the ecological and 
environmental factors and the future effects of current circumstances were not drawn upon 
heavily enough, as state of ecological necessity was not granted. It must also be noted, that due to 
the damming of the Danube and the drop of water levels, many regions surrounding the banks 
and wells dried up, biodiversity was in grave danger as unusual deaths of large fish and other 
species were reported, and the rate of particle-settling in the river increased drastically which in 
turn increases the risk and likelihood of aquifer contamination40. It can be contested that this is a 
state of ecological necessity.  
This also brings into question the ICJ’s view of sustainable development. It is a newer 
development in international environmental law describing the principle of balancing 
                                                 
38 Gabriel E. Eckstein, Yoran Eckstein. “International Water Law, Groundwater Resources And The Danube Dam 
Case”, in Gambling With Groundwater: Physical, Chemical and Biological Aspects of Aquifer-Stream Relations 
(Washington College of Law, American University, 1998)  
39 ICJ 1997, paragraph. 53 
Gabriel E. Eckstein, Yoran Eckstein. “International Water Law, Groundwater Resources And The Danube Dam 
Case”, in Gambling With Groundwater: Physical, Chemical and Biological Aspects of Aquifer-Stream Relations 
(Washington College of Law, American University, 1998 
40 Gabriel E. Eckstein, Yoran Eckstein. “International Water Law, Groundwater Resources And The Danube Dam 
Case”, in Gambling With Groundwater: Physical, Chemical and Biological Aspects of Aquifer-Stream Relations 
(Washington College of Law, American University, 1998 
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development with environmental protection, containing within itself three main principles: the 
concept of sustainable development, the precautionary principle, and the principle of 
Environmental Impact Assessments41. Despite this being a development that is agreed to be of 
great importance, the specificities of its meaning remain debated. The ICJ presented in the 
judgement sustainable development as a ‘concept’, thus implying it was not legally binding as 
international customary law, and furthermore, the ICJ did not develop the parameters of this 
concept. Although this does show that sustainable development has a certain status in 
international law, it denies it as a State responsibility42. Contesting to this conclusion was Judge 
Weeramantry. His decision marked a sort of milestone in international environmental law, as it 
was the beginning of jurisprudence on this matter for the ICJ. 
 This case was also thought to be important, as it could have further defined what types of 
damages, in an environmental context and give rise to liability within international society. These 
expectations however, were not met, as the ICJ did not rely so much on international water law 
principles, but on treaty laws. 
 There was mention in Judge Weeramantry’s interpretation of the case of sustainable 
development in the context of human rights. This is greatly discussed as being a primary step to 
acknowledging future arguments on rights to the environment. The argument he presented was 
then used in court cases to support claims to the right of life, which can be degraded by the 
deterioration of the environment (argument given by the United States), along with the right to 
life and a clean environment43. 
                                                 
41 Jessica Howley. “The Gabci kovo-Nagymaros Case: The Influence of the International Court of Justice on the Law 
of Sustainable Development” Queensland Law Student Review, Vol 2:1, (2009)  
42 Jessica Howley. “The Gabci kovo-Nagymaros Case: The Influence of the International Court of Justice on the Law 
of Sustainable Development” Queensland Law Student Review, Vol 2:1, (2009) 
43 Jessica Howley. “The Gabci kovo-Nagymaros Case: The Influence of the International Court of Justice on the Law 
of Sustainable Development” Queensland Law Student Review, Vol 2:1, (2009) 
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 It was very interesting that the ICJ did not consider a State being under the reign of 
communism as a likely cause of why the project was adopted to begin with. It was well 
established that, in communist countries at that time, it was common for leaders to attempt or 
plan to reshape nature as a way of producing economic gain while simultaneously causing many 
irreparable damages to the environment44. There had been several attempts at such projects 
before the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, and although within the 1977 Treaty there is mention of 
the environment and its protection, after assessing the effects of the project (as done by Hungary), 
it can be said that the proper protective measures were not followed, especially not with regards 
to modern international environmental law. Interestingly enough, the lack of these considerations 
and measures by a communist government were seen to be of very little relevance. It is a 
remaining query that, had the implications of such decisions under such political circumstances 
been not of an environmental nature, but that of, say, national security; would a shift in the 
political regime be sufficient to claim fundamental change of circumstances? If so, would it be 
deemed grounds for the termination of a treaty? 
 The ruling on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case had a great impact on the perception of the 
roles of political circumstances and environmental circumstances. Although many contest that the 
rulings did not take into consideration the severity of ecological and environmental effects of the 
project, the publications of opinions given by judicial members, such as Judge Weeramantry, 
have served as precedence and as support for claims to human rights to the environment and to 
sustainable development. This case brought into light newly developing norms of international 
environmental law and its emerging place in international society, thus international law. This is 
evident in the formal address to the ICJ and the ICJ’s mention of these factors in the judgements 
                                                 
44 Kevin Kurland, Jerry Fortunato, Leslie Barcus. "Hungary Dam, Case 34." in Trade and Environment Database, 
case 34 (1998). 
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(even though they were found to be inadequate grounds). Simply the mention of the necessity of 
international environmental law, its factors and the concept of sustainable development affected 
the interpretation of the aforementioned in international and domestic judicial legal practices.  
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